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The automobile which was delivered by the defendant dealer to the plain-
tiff's husband was to be used for demonstration purposes only. The parties
did not contemplate the sale of this demonstrator. Therefore the car actu-
ally involved was not the subject of a sale or a proposed sale.0 Under
circumstances similar to the instant case, although not involving the lia-
bility of a dealer for latent defects, it was held that the relationship be-
tween an automobile dealer and a prospective purchaser driving the former's
car is one of bailor-bailee. 7 So when a dealer leaves goods with a prospec-
tive purchaser for examination, a bailment for mutual benefit is estab-
lished.8 A bailor owes the bailee the duty to inform him of defects which
are, or reasonably should be, known to the bailor 0 Since the court in the
instant case found that the defendant made a reasonable inspection, he
would not have been liable even on the bailment theory. It is submitted,
however, that the court's decision would have been technically sounder had
the bailment theory been adhered to.10 E. M. S.
TORTS-RADIO DEFAMATION-PRIVILEGE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS-[Ore-
gon].-During the broadcast of a murder trial the defendant's counsel said
that a witness for the state "was not truthful and was lower than a rattle-
snake because a rattlesnake gives warning before it strikes." That witness
brought an action of libel against the counsel who made the statements,
the judge who presided over the criminal trial, and the radio station on
the theory that the broadcast permitted by the trial judge was unlawful
and that, by reason of the untruths and malice in the statements, all the
defendants participating in that wrongful act were joint tortfeasors.
The judge was held free from liability.1 In both England2 and the
United States,3 because of public policy, a judge is absolutely privileged
as to defamatory statements in the course of judicial proceedings, 4 even
6. In Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co. (1930) 99 Cal. App. 795, 290 Pac. 919,
cited supra note 2, there was a possibility of a sale of the particular wash-
ing machine. Therefore that case can be distinguished from the instant
case.
7. Harris v. Whitehall (1936) 55 Ga. App. 130, 189 S. E. 392; Hamp v.
Universal Auto Co. (1933) 173 Wash. 585, 24 P. (2d) 77.
8. Israel v. Uhr (Sup. Ct. 1917) 164 N. Y. S. 50.
9. Goddard, Outlines of the Law of Bailments and Carriers (2nd ed.
1928) 20, sec. 20.
10. In the Restatement, Torts (1934) sec. 388, the liability of a supplier
of a chattel is discussed. In the comment thereunder, it is stated that the
rule as to a supplier of a chattel is applicable to cases of bailment. Since
the instant case is strictly one of a bailment, this section might have been
applied by the court in the instant case. Instead, the court quoted from
sec. 402, which deals with the liability of a vendor of a chattel.
1. Irwin v. Ashurst (Ore. 1938) 74 P. (2d) 1127.
2. Scott v. Stansfield (1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 220; Law v. Llewellyn (1906)
1 I. B. 487, 75 L. J. K. B. 320, 94 L. T. 359; Newell, Slander and Libel
(4th ed. 1924) sec. 360.
3. Mundy v. MacDonald (1921) 216 Mich. 444, 185 N. W. 877; Young
v. Moore (1922) 29 Ga. App. 73, 113 S. E. 701.
4. Douglas v. Collins (1934) 152 Misc. 839, 273 N. Y. S. 663, in which
defamatory statements made by a judge, after he had adjourned the case,
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though made falsely and maliciously. It was contended in the instant case
that the absolute immunity of the judge "does not extend beyond the four
walls of the courtroom" and that installation of the microphone in the
courtroom was an "extra-judicial and illegal act." The Supreme Court of
Oregon held that installation of a microphone in a courtroom for the pur-
pose of broadcasting judicial proceedings was not unlawful but was a mat-
ter solely within the discretion of the trial judge.5 It is possible that other
jurisdictions might in the future hold the broadcasting of courtroom pro-
ceedings against public policy. What effect this may have on the absolute
privilege of the judge is a matter of conjecture. In this connection it is
interesting to note that the American Bar Association has recently gone
on record as being opposed to broadcasts of judicial proceedings from the
courtroom."
Defamatory statements made by attorneys in their conduct of cases in
court are, in England, absolutely privileged, even though irrelevant.7 In
the United States they are absolutely privileged only when pertinent to the
case; 8 if irrelevant or not pertinent to the issues, the privilege is only quali-
fied.9 Public policy gives rise to a presumption in favor of relevancy and
pertinency.1 1 The court concluded that the jury's general finding for the
defendant in the instant libel case involved a finding of fact that the state-
ments made by counsel were either relevant or else non-malicious.
The radio station had made no comment during the broadcast of judicial
proceedings. Publication of the statements by the radio station was held
to be privileged, if defendant attorney who uttered them was privileged,
presumably on the theory that publication by a radio station is analogous
to publication by a newspaper. An earlier Oregon case had held that a
defamatory statement qualifiedly privileged on the part of its author be-
stows a similar privilege on the newspaper publishing it, provided that
publication in the newspaper was a reasonable method of publicizing the
and as he was descending from the bench, and before he had proceeded
more than 10 feet into the courtroom, were held made in the course of his
official capacity and absolutely privileged.
5. Supra, note 1.
6. The American Bar Association in September, 1937, adopted the fol-
lowing new Canon 35 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics: "Proceedings in
court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking
of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated
to detract from the essential dignity of court proceedings, degrade the court
and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the minds of the public
and should not be permitted."
7. Munster v. Lamb (1883) 11 Q. B. Div. 588, 52 L. J. Q. B. 726, 49
L. T. 252, 47 J. P. 805; Newell, Slander and Libel (4th ed. 1924) sec. 362.
8. Hastings v. Lusk (1839) 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 410, 34 Am. Dec. 330;
Lawson v. Hicks (1862) 38 Ala. 279, 81 Am. Dec. 49; Maulsby v. Reif-
snider (1888) 69 Md. 143, 14 Atl. 505.
9. Throckmorton's Cooley, Torts (1930) 359. Dicta: Maulsby v. Reif-
snider (1888) 69 Md. 143, 14 Atl. 505.
10. Newell, Slander and Libel (4th ed. 1924) 405; Myers v. Hodges
(1907) 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357.
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statement." Whether such a theory is applicable to the facts of the in-
stant case may be a matter of dispute.'2 The general finding for the attor-
ney necessarily meant that publication by the broadcasting station was
privileged. 3
The instant case is a logical extension of the well settled principles in
defamation of privilege arising from judicial proceedings. Its special in-
terest lies in its exposition of the different principles applicable to several
types of defendants involved in a single situation, and in its being appar-
ently the first case in Anglo-American law in which privilege has been suc-
cessfully used as a defense in an action to recover for radio defamation. 14
J. K.
11. Israel v. Portland News Pub. Co. (1936) 152 Ore. 225, 53 P. (2d)
529; in accord Restatement, Torts, Tentative Draft, No. 13, sec. 1036, com-
ment b; Preston v. Hobbs (1914) 161 App. Div. 363, 146 N. Y. S. 419.
12. This is disputable on the ground that a radio station has no control
over what is broadcast during the course of judicial proceedings. The radio
station has no advance knowledge of what it will broadcast under such
circumstances. A newspaper publisher, however, may under ordinary cir-
cumstances, by scrutinizing a manuscript and by reading proof, exercise
effective control over what the newspaper publishes. A contrary view would
reject such a distinction between publication by a newspaper and by a
radio station, if one were to proceed on the theory that a radio station was
absolutely liable, regardless of negligence, for the broadcast of all de-
famatory statements. See Vold, Defamation By Radio (1934) 19 Minn. L.
Rev. 611, 646.
13. Supra, note 1.
14. This statement is based on a study of all the reported English and
American cases made for "Radio Defamation-Libel or Slander?" Note
(1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY 262.
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